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North Africa and the Making of American Psychological Warfare and 
Propaganda, 1942-1945 
Abstract 
In 1942, the United States founded the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Tasked with preparing North 
Africa for the first major Allied invasion of World War II, the OSS conducted extensive preparations that 
drew on resistance groups for support, utilized radio propaganda to destroy morale, spread rumors to 
discredit the enemy, and produced leaflets and pamphlets that influenced local populations. Operation 
Torch, as it would be known, was instrumental in laying the foundation for U.S. intelligence operations in 
the World War II period and beyond. After Operation Torch, the OSS conducted numerous psychological 
operations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. While the OSS faced challenges in conducting 
propaganda, stemming from jurisdictional battles with other U.S. wartime intelligence agencies, it was 
able to significantly improve its propaganda methods and tactics. In fact, by 1944, OSS radio programs 
had become so sophisticated that they fooled American military radio operators into believing they were 
enemy broadcasts. Other OSS psychological operations also showed great success, showcased by the 
thousands of soldiers who would surrender to Allied forces with OSS-made pamphlets in hand. Eventually, 
with the end of the War, President Truman abolished the OSS, instead replacing it with transitional 
intelligence agencies which culminated in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. This 
study utilizes a variety of recently declassified OSS documents to emphasize the importance of North 
Africa in the birth of modern American psychological warfare, which seems to stem from present day 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. 
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August 16, 1940  Creation of OCCCRBAR 
July 11, 1941   Creation of COI 
July 30, 1941   Establishment of CIAA 
June 13, 1942 Creation of OWI, OSS, and other agencies as well as dissolution of 
COI 
May 1942   Renaming of OSS Mediterranean section to Africa section 
August 24, 1942  Correspondence about recommendations in preparation for Torch 
September 30, 1942  Preparations being carried out for Torch 
November 8, 1942  Operation Torch landings 
December 23, 1942  JCS issued 155/4/D 
January 3, 1943  OSS General Order No. 9 
February 1943   Insertion of “Tommy” into Italy to gather intelligence 
March 1, 1943   Major King memorandum on North Africa 
March 9, 1943   Executive Order 9312 distinguishing OWI and OSS differences 
March 15, 1943  Report on lessons from Operations Torch by Wallace Deuel 
April 4, 1943   JCS issued 155/7/D which revised 155/4/D 
April 1943   MO sends out first rumors in Italy, SACO agreement reached 
June 12, 1943   Donovan sends field manual on psychological warfare 
June 1943   MO produces ten million leaflets in North Africa 
July 9, 1943   Allied invasion of Sicily, Italy 
August 5, 1943  JCS established JICAs 
October 26, 1943  JCS published 155/11/D, the final basic directive for the OSS 
November 1943  MO disseminated rumors in Egypt 
January 1944  Start of “Morse” radio program 
February 1944   “Sioux” mission in Stockholm 
April 1944 Start of Soldatensender Calais radio, establishment of MO radio in 
Palestine, MO Far East becomes operational 
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June 6, 1944   Operation Overlord invasion 
June 1944 Start of Wie Lange Noch? poster campaign, MO team meets with 
“Horsebreeders” team 
July 20, 1944   Failed coup against Hitler, switch from Soldatensender to “Joker” 
July 1944 Jedburghs liberate French towns, “Who is your enemy” rumor and 
leaflet campaign with OWI 
August 1944 “League for Lonely Women” campaign, start of Volksender Drei 
radio, “Boston” radio in Izmir, approval for JN-27 
September 1944  Operation Annie radio 
October 1944   Warnings about Das Neue Deutsch newspaper 
November 1944  End of Volksender Drei and “Boston” programs 
November 18, 1944  Donovan submits memorandum to President Roosevelt 
April 12, 1945   Death of President Roosevelt 
August 25, 1945  Donovan informs Budget Bureau of OSS liquidation budget 
August 31, 1945  Executive Order 9608 establishing IIIS 
September 20, 1945 Executive Order 9620 terminating OSS, transfer of OSS branches 
to new branch IRIS at Department of State 
October 1, 1945  Liquidation of the OSS 
December 31, 1945  Liquidation of the OWI 
January 22, 1946  Establishment of NIA and CIG 
May 1947   Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter takes over as first DCI 
July 26, 1947   Signing of National Security Act of 1947 creating CIA and NSC 











In November 1942, the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) played a 
decisive role in planning Operation Torch, as the Allied invasion of Vichy French-controlled 
North Africa was known. The OSS provided maps to Allied forces, broadcasted speeches, 
dropped leaflets in French, and provided support to local armed resistance groups, and in this 
way developed the first psychological warfare and propaganda operation undertaken by a U.S. 
intelligence agency. After this foundational event, however, tensions immediately arose between 
the wartime U.S. intelligence agencies, especially the OSS and the Office of War Information 
(OWI) over jurisdictional issues regarding their psychological warfare and propaganda efforts. 
Despite these tensions, U.S. intelligence agencies managed to systematize their “morale 
operations” and propaganda during the war, while developing new tactics of psychological 
warfare, such as the use of rumor, blackmail, and forgery. This study examines the study of 
psychological warfare while arguing for the centrality of North Africa, and Operation Torch, to 
the process. 
A review of declassified OSS documents from the electronic reading room of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s website, as well as of war reports written by the Strategic Services Unit of 
the U.S. War Department, shows how numerous intelligence committees developed increasingly 
sophisticated efforts in joint intelligence gathering, the collection and dissemination of reports, 
and the psychological assessment of enemy situations, outlooks, and capabilities. While the U.S. 
government formed new organizations and oversight committees to establish chain of command 
in the intelligence field, propaganda efforts and what we would call “morale operations” 
continued to advance. As World War II raged on, the OSS continued to conduct psychological 
operations throughout the world. In 1943, the OSS expanded into Europe and Southeast Asia. By 
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1945, the OSS had established itself in the Far East. Between 1942, when Operation Torch 
began, until the dissolution of the OSS in September 1945, OSS operatives became masters of 
deception, fully trained in the craft of psychological warfare after many successful operations 
that reflected the increasing sophistication of their work. 
 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ultimately absorbed the work of the OSS and 
other wartime agencies when the U.S. government restructured operations upon the end of World 
War II. Looking back on the history of the OSS in the Maghreb, and specifically in the territories 
corresponding to present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, we can see that the psychological 
warfare methods, procedures, and tactics that the OSS established during Operation Torch were 
instrumental in laying the foundation for U.S. intelligence operations during the Cold War and 
up to today. 
This study builds upon a strong body of books and reports published in the 1970s, ‘80s, 
and ‘90s about the OSS and its implementation of psychological warfare and propaganda, along 
with a number of articles published in the early 2000s. Interest in the topic has faded somewhat 
in recent years, and yet, the time is now ripe for a reassessment. That is because, as recently as 
2013, the U.S. government declassified a new body of documents from OSS archives and 
published them online in the electronic reading room of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
website in 2016. These declassified OSS reports and documents provide new and original 
content which can help provide details about the true complexity of operations as well as 
sophisticated command and control measures implemented directly from the director, William J. 
Donovan (1883-1959), to operatives in the OSS.  
This study also draws upon a more theoretical literature consisting of books and 
resources that describe U.S. psychological warfare and propaganda beyond the OSS and the 
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wartime setting of North Africa. This literature is worth reviewing because it can help to show 
prevailing motivations and conceptions of psychological warfare and propaganda among U.S. 
strategists in these years as well as how the period covered in this study had far-reaching 


















Terminology and Roadmap 
 Before proceeding, it is worth reviewing some technical language and terminology that 
will appear throughout this study. Given that this study deals with the foundation of American 
propaganda during World War II, it is necessary to define psychological warfare. The term 
“psychological warfare” evolved over time. And yet, William J. Donovan, the director of the 
OSS, provided a useful early definition in a report called the “Basic Estimate of Psychological 
Warfare:” 
 Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, including moral and 
physical, by which the end is attained-other than those of recognized military operations, 
but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military 
actions, which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his 
political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, 
assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his 
acquisition of such support, assistance, or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or 
increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or to 
increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.1 
 
After properly defining psychological warfare by the man who ordered the execution of a vast 
majority of it in World War II, it becomes necessary to also distinguish between the three types 
of propaganda to which this study refers: “white,” “black,” and “gray” propaganda. The 
Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda defines “white propaganda” as  
 Propaganda from properly identified sources. White propaganda is open and 
straightforward and makes no pretense that it is anything but propaganda. It is also called 
overt propaganda. White propaganda is officially acknowledged by the government that 
disseminates it. Examples of white propaganda include Radio Free Europe, Radio 
Liberty, Voice of America, Radio Moscow, official government radios in World War II, 
and recruiting posters.2 
 
1 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Report of Basic Estimate on Psychological Warfare, CIA-
RDP13X00001R000100250003-4 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 7. 
2 Martin J. Manning, and Herbert Romerstein, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 2004), 319. 
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Thus, when the term overt propaganda or white propaganda arises, it is referring to propaganda 
that is clear in its intent and purpose. The other primary type of propaganda is “black 
propaganda,” which is also referred to as covert propaganda. The Historical Dictionary of 
American Propaganda defines “black propaganda” thus: 
 Black propaganda refers to falsely attributed propaganda. Sometimes practitioners of this 
form pretend that the information is being published by the enemy to deceive the reader 
or listener as to the origin of the information, which may be true or false. The results are 
usually quite ingenious and rather intriguing. Samples include fake newspapers, 
broadsides, leaflets, booklets, postage stamps, radio broadcasts, currency, and even army 
discharge forms requiring only the name of the soldier to be filled in. During World War 
II, the British were extremely successful with their black propaganda campaign, whereas 
the Germans were often unsuccessful, too obvious in their message, with fake stories 
unsubtle in their lies and poor printing. Black propaganda was often created to undermine 
the enemy's morale.3 
Out of the three types of propaganda, black propaganda is referenced the most in this study as it 
was the exceedingly prevalent type of propaganda utilized by the OSS. There were instances, 
however, where U.S. intelligence agencies produced propaganda that fell in-between black and 
white propaganda. That type of propaganda is called gray propaganda, defined this way: 
 Form of propaganda located between white propaganda and black propaganda in which 
truth and falsehoods are mixed and whose origin is lightly concealed. The true origin can 
sometimes be determined when the question, "Who benefits?" is asked. The source may 
or may not be accurately presented, and the correctness of the information is not 
ascertainable. Gray propaganda has often been dismissed as nothing more that poorly 
disguised covert, or black, propaganda that originates from a source other than the true 
one.4 
While this study does not frequently refer to gray propaganda, it is important to understand what 
it is so that one can understand American psychological warfare efforts, especially regarding the 
analysis of enemy psychological capabilities.  
 
3 Martin J. Manning, and Herbert Romerstein, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, 28. 
4 Martin J. Manning, and Herbert Romerstein, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, 124. 
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 There is another term that is frequently employed in this study: “morale operations.” 
Morale operations or “MO” for short, was a branch of the OSS designated to conduct black 
propaganda to undermine the morale of enemy troops and larger enemy civilian populations.5 
The MO branch was officially established on January 3, 1943 by General Order No. 9, but that is 
not to say that the OSS did not conduct black propaganda and other “morale operations” before 
the branch’s official inception within the OSS.6 Rather, it seems that the formal inception of the 
morale operations branch of the OSS consolidated all the various morale operations into one 
section for logistical efficiency.  
Again, this study asserts that the psychological warfare methods, procedures, and tactics 
that the OSS established during Operation Torch in North Africa were instrumental in laying the 
foundation for U.S. intelligence operations during the Cold War and today. Five sections follow 
to establish this claim by showing how and why Operation Torch was foundational. 
The first section of this study defined some technical terms that will be used later in the 
study. The second section focuses on the establishment of the OSS and OWI from the Office of 
the Coordinator of Information (COI). It sets the stage for the origins of the wartime intelligence 
agencies and provides a starting point for examining American psychological warfare in World 
War II. The third section explains Operation Torch in detail as the first major operation of the 
OSS and first primary instance in which the U.S. defense establishment used propaganda and 
psychological warfare on a grand scale during World War II. This section emphasizes the 
importance of North Africa as the foundation for the changes that followed later in the war. The 
fourth section discusses the tensions that arose between the OSS and OWI over jurisdiction of 
 
5 Robert H. Alcorn, No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the OSS (New York: D. McKay Co, 1962), 83. 
6 Strategic Services Unit, United States War Department, Washington Organization, vol. 1 of War Report: Office of 
Strategic Services (Washington, D.C., 1949), 212. 
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propaganda implementation. This jurisdictional conflict is another factor that contributed to the 
sophistication of methods and procedures in American psychological warfare following the 
events in North Africa. The fifth and sixth sections provide examples of the growing 
sophistication of American propaganda efforts in North Africa, broader U.S. government efforts 
in the Middle East, operations in Europe, and later developments in Asia. The final section 
analyzes the end of the OSS and transition to the CIA. These sections follow an order that is not 
only thematic but chronological as well, reflecting the evolution of U.S. policies towards 















The Establishment of U.S. Intelligence Agencies 
 In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called on William Donovan to improve the 
quality of intelligence reaching Washington, D.C. Shortly thereafter, the President received 
various recommendations and drafts of ideas to solve this intelligence problem. In fact, earlier 
drafts of the presidential order that would later lead to the Office of the Coordinator of 
Information mentioned a Coordinator of Strategic Information and a Coordinator of Defense 
Information.7 The COI was established by a military order of President Roosevelt on July 11, 
1941.8 President Roosevelt wanted the agency to focus on two primary mission parameters: the 
coordination of intelligence collection and analysis from all sources, including the armed forces, 
and the transmission of information abroad to areas outside Latin America.9 President Roosevelt 
established the COI over the strong objections of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director 
J. Edgar Hoover and officials in the U.S. Department of State, the Army, and the Navy, all of 
whom were fearful of losing power through the division of intelligence services.10  
 Once established, William Donovan, the new head or “Coordinator” of the COI, 
appointed Robert Sherwood as the director of the Foreign Information Service (FIS), an integral 
part of the COI, which was headquartered in New York City, and had the mission of spreading 
democracy and explaining the objectives of the United States throughout the world. In 
accordance with its objectives, the FIS cleared plans and projects that dealt with U.S. foreign and 
military policies by coordinating with, and removing possible conflicts among, the State, War, 
and Navy Departments and by attempting to implement its operations in coordination with the 
 
7 Martin J. Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, 69. 
8 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Published for Operations Research Office, 
Johns Hopkins University by John Hopkins Press, 1958), 127. 
9 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 127. 
10 Martin J. Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, 69. 
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British government and its Special Operations Executive (SOE).11 Donovan was not to oversee 
propaganda and intelligence activities in Latin America, however.12 A bitter dispute with the 
Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) director Nelson Rockefeller eliminated 
Latin America from Donovan's portfolio.13  
President Franklin Roosevelt created the Office of the Coordination of Commercial and 
Cultural Relations Between the American Republics (OCCCRBAR) by Council of National 
Defense order on August 16, 1940 and Nelson A. Rockefeller was appointed its coordinator. It 
was abolished by Executive Order 8840 (July 30, 1941), and its functions were transferred to the 
Office of Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, which became primarily concerned with 
commercial and financial problems of the Latin American countries.14  
Still months after the creation of the COI, top-echelon leaders from the President were 
deeply engrossed in problems of general military and political strategy and likely were unaware 
of, or indifferent to, the potentials and limitations of psychological warfare on the global stage 
relative to the Nazis and Japanese. Consequently, the level of preparation and organization 
required for effective operations in psychological warfare was neither clear nor consistent at the 
time of the Pearl Harbor attack in December, 1941.15 Because of this, the U.S. government 
lacked psychological warfare capabilities and operations. Within six months, however, officials 
devised and submitted plans to President Roosevelt to improve the organization of intelligence 
 
11 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 127. 
12 Clayton D. Laurie, “Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks: The OSS Morale Operations Branch in Europe, 
1943-1945,” Prologue 25, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 260. 
13 Martin J. Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, 69. 
14 Martin J. Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, 70. 
15 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 127. 
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and psychological capabilities in ways that aimed to remedy administrational problems and 
implement better planning and coordination systems.  
On January 12, 1942, William O. Hall, the Budget Bureau monitor of COI affairs, stated 
that it was time to unify the domestic and foreign propaganda and psychological warfare 
agencies in an effort to bring the radio, news, and pamphlet departments of the COI, CIAA, OFF, 
OCD, and OEM under a single organization.16 This declaration of a need for changes to the 
institution of American psychological warfare resulted in tensions at the onset. 
Tensions arose, in particular, between Robert Sherwood, director of the FIS, and William 
Donovan. While he and Donovan had begun their relationship seemingly without any problems, 
they soon came to a most unpleasant parting of their ways. Sherwood became very unhappy in 
part over having FIS considered as "cover" for other activities. Apparently, Donovan, and many 
in FIS, found Sherwood's administrative talents deficient, and Sherwood was neither able to get 
someone to take on additional tasks for him nor to delegate responsibility to others. Sherwood's 
closeness to President Roosevelt led Sherwood to think that he was his own boss, whereas 
Donovan, though exceptionally respected, did not enjoy such close relations with Roosevelt; this 
difference led Donovan and Sherwood to stop speaking by early 1942.17 
Six months after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9182 on June 
13, 1942, which established the OWI as a centralized organization of various information 
services, including the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), Office of Government Reports (OGR), 
 
16 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981), 121. 
17 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, 122. 
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the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and the FIS 
contained within the COI.18  
Executive Order 9182 dissolved the COI and created the OWI along with the OSS, with 
Donovan leading it.19 The OSS was placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) and Donovan reported directly to the President.20 The FIS, although transferred under 
jurisdiction of the OWI, became its own overseas branch.21 This executive order did not clearly 
establish a division of responsibility between the OSS and OWI. Because of this, jurisdictional 
conflicts arose between the OWI and OSS, which will be discussed in a later section. It should 
also be mentioned that Donovan and the OSS lost to the FBI the authority to perform 
counterespionage in the Western Hemisphere.22 Despite this, the OSS would continue to 
coordinate with the FBI for intelligence priorities and information on persons of interest, with J. 
Edgar Hoover even corresponding with William Donovan.23 With the OSS just recently created, 
it would soon face the enormous task of planning for one of the largest joint intelligence-military 





18 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 128. 
19 Alfred H. Paddock, US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-
1952 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 7. 
20 John Whiteclay Chambers II, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II 
(Washington, DC: National Park Service, 2008), 31. 
21 Alfred H. Paddock, US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, 7. 
22 John Whiteclay Chambers II, OSS Training in the National Parks, 31. 
23 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS/FBI Correspondence, OSS War Situation Reports, OSS Inter-Office/Inter-




  On the morning of November 8, 1942, approximately 100,000 Allied troops landed over 
a stretch of almost 2,000 miles of North African coast, at points in Vichy French-controlled 
Morocco and Algeria. This venture, called Operation Torch, represented the first major offensive 
of the United States in World War II.24 There were significant preparations involved in 
establishing the conditions in North Africa for ensuring the operation’s success. From the OSS, 
Allied officers with the landing fleets received maps of landing points, nearby airport and port 
locations and measurements, the disposition of the French fleet, the number of planes on every 
airfield, wind and weather conditions, and the locations of French headquarters and German 
offices among other detailed information.25 These actions, which signaled the efficiency and 
sophistication of U.S. intelligence gathering during this period of warfare, showed the critical 
value of the OSS for the success of Operation Torch in North Africa and for American wartime 
operations more broadly.  
 Several declassified OSS documents underscore the remarkable thoroughness and 
efficiency that the OSS displayed in its preparations for Operation Torch, while also revealing 
the strategies that the organization pursued. While this section will utilize information from a 
variety of books and declassified OSS documents, the OSS “Plan for North Africa,” a fifty-eight-
page report published in September 1942 and declassified in 2013, helps support the claim of this 
study most significantly. Because this report served as a template for operational planning that 
occurred later in World War II, this study closely analyzes the entire document. The memoranda 
in the “Plan for North Africa” cover a variety of topics such as the purchase of millions of francs 
 
24 David A. Walker, "OSS and Operation Torch," Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 4 (1987): 667. 
25 Strategic Services Unit, United States War Department, Operations in the Field, vol. 2 of War Report: Office of 
Strategic Services (Washington, D.C., 1949), 18. 
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for payments and expenditures, the distribution of leaflets by plane, the broadcast of a 
proclamation by President Roosevelt and his “Four Freedoms” speech, and the promised support 
of the French Separatists who would attempt a coup d’état of the Vichy governments in Morocco 
and Algeria.  
 The declassified, “Plan for North Africa,” contains a series of memoranda between the 
director of the OSS, William Donovan, and members of “Joint Security Control.” Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) historian Wilber Hoare, Jr., described Joint Security Control in a memorandum for 
record: 
 The Joint Security Control was a very small organization established under the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in August 1942, having an office representative for each of the Army and 
Navy. Its original purpose was to coordinate the security arrangements regarding the 
planning for Operation TORCH, the landing in North Africa. Afterward, it took on other 
duties of coordinating security arrangements of the two military services. It never had 
more than a very small staff… It was abolished in October 1947 as one of the incidents 
attendant upon the unification of the military services under the National Security Act of 
1947. Its functions were taken over directly by the JCS, and it might be said that they 
came to be assumed by the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee].26 
This correspondence commenced with Col. Donovan on August 24, 1942, in a memorandum 
addressed to the JCS with his recommendations of setting up operations in anticipation of 
Operation Torch. It seems that a conversation took place between Col. William A. Eddy, who 
was leading the North Africa Operations for the OSS, and Donovan regarding the 
recommendations for operations. The next memorandum, dated August 26, 1942, reports on this 
conversation, and provides key information about the establishment of personnel in North Africa. 
 
26 Wilber Hoare, Jr., Interviewed by “[REDACTED]”, February 11, 1971, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint 
Security Control: Memorandum for the Record (Washington, D.C., 1971), 1-2.   
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For example, Col. Eddy discusses the promotion of military officers and Vice-Consuls in the 
area who were to lead operations.27  
 There is another memorandum dated August 26, 1942, from Eddy to Donovan, which 
identifies the specific preparations that should be conducted, including leaflets and pamphlets to 
be distributed in French, Arabic, and Spanish announcing the arrival of American forces; 
detailed arrangements for wireless communications; preparations of supplies to guerilla groups; 
arrangements to assassinate members of the German and Italian Armistice Commission (by 
French agents); acquisition of 40 million francs; acquisition of a hydrographer, an individual 
skilled in the study of water features, at General Patton’s request; the establishment of a 
broadcast station at Gibraltar; and more.28 
 Following this memorandum, Col. Donovan then sent a memorandum to the JCS for 
approval, dated August 27, 1942, with primarily the same recommendations and preparations 
that the memorandum from Col. Eddy, dated August 26, contained.29 
 A memorandum from members of Joint Security Control, including Major General 
Strong, dated September 11, 1942, to Col. Donovan, shows that JCS received his August 27 
Memorandum. This September 11 Memorandum lists the various recommendations set forth by 
Col. Donovan in his August 27 Memorandum and approves or disapproves each of them. JCS 
approved the acquisition of 40 million francs, the provisions of radio communications, the 
earmarking of supplies for guerilla groups, the acquisition of the hydrographer, the preparation 
 
27 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch 
(Washington, D.C., 1942), 50.  
28 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 41-
47. 




of leaflets and posters, and the movement of OSS agents to make way for the assaulting military 
commanders on D-Day. JCS rejected a proposal for staff talks between Americans and leaders of 
the Separatist movement and the payment of salaries and pensions for all officers who joined the 
revolt.30 JCS included recommendations about how the Supreme Commander and local 
commanders should handle certain aspects of approved actions.  
 There is also a memorandum on psychological warfare, dated September 8, 1942. This 
memorandum includes information about the situation in North Africa, with reasons supporting 
why psychological operations would be effective.31 It also includes discussions about the French 
Separatists and their conditions for assisting American forces, such as demands for U.S. 
recognition of French territory; economic assistance; circulation of French currencies; circulation 
of a “Yellow Book,” which would outline German violations of the armistice agreement; and the 
provisioning of small arms.32 This memorandum goes on to explain the reasoning behind 
psychological operations and offers recommendations from previous memoranda.33 An 
additional recommendation suggests that President Roosevelt should prepare to record an 
informal talk to the French people concerning all the facts about the Separatist Movement and 
the intervention of U.S. forces that would restore North Africa to France.34 This memorandum 
finishes by discussing radio broadcasting of the President’s proclamation, dissemination of 
leaflets with the proclamation, and the meeting of American representatives with the Sultan of 
 
30 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 30-
31. 
31 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 3-
5. 
32 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 6-
8. 
33 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 9-
14. 
34 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 15. 
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Morocco, Mohammed V, to explain intentions and ensure friendship.35 In fact, the Morale 
Operations Branch translated President Roosevelt‘s proclamation to the Moroccans into literary 
Arabic (fusha), and it characterized the American invasion into North Africa as a jihad of 
freedom while calling American troops “Holy Warriors.”36 The MO Branch also translated 
President Roosevelt’s speech into a form of Arabic that aimed to be dignified, like classical or 
Koranic Arabic. 
 There are two appendices that support this psychological warfare memorandum: 
Appendix A, which includes the suggested proclamation, and Appendix B, which outlines the 
objectives of the psychological operations.37 These objectives include assuring the goodwill of 
the French and native populations, combating panic, preventing efforts by Axis agents, and 
breaking down the will of any French units intending to oppose American occupation.38 
Appendix B further discusses the importance of the appearance of U.S. forces; ceremonial visits 
by commanders; distribution of free food, cigarettes, soap, and other items with propaganda 
slogans on them; mobile broadcasting units; distribution of leaflets; and elements of 
counterpropaganda, such as the reporting of rumors and neutralization of enemy broadcasts.39 
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There is a final memorandum for Col. Donovan, dated September 30, 1942, from Joint 
Security Control, which lists the actions being carried out based on recommendations in the 
September 8 Memorandum, the August 27 Memorandum, and the August 24 Memorandum.40  
This series of document correspondence between the OSS and the JCS reveals a great 
deal about intelligence gathering and protocols, psychological warfare operations, chain of 
command, US foreign and diplomatic interests, and much more. Given all the information that 
these documents reveal, it is no surprise that the government took so long to declassify them –
seventy-one years!41 
The series of memoranda also shows the significant cooperation between the OSS and the 
U.S. military. For example, at the time, the OSS relied on the U.S military for approval of its 
operations, mainly the JCS. If the OSS had not depended on its authorization, there would have 
been no need to have this lengthy correspondence of approval memoranda. Instead, there might 
have been a singular memorandum outlining the actions to be taken, authorized solely by 
William Donovan. Thus, these documents give indications about the chain of command during 
World War II and the early days of the OSS. Other examples of military cooperation are shown 
by the recommendation of officer rank promotions by OSS officials, the distribution of small 
arms, ceremonial visits by local and supreme commanders, and the appearance of soldiers during 
 
40 Central Intelligence Agency, OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch, 1-
2. 
41 Seventy-one years is a significant amount of time in declassification timelines. Time until declassification varies 
by the content of the information and the potential damage that could occur to U.S. national security should the 
information be released. Some information is released before others due to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests. For comparison, the CIA published the internal investigation into the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in 1984; 
it was declassified in 2016: Central Intelligence Agency, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation Draft Volume 
V CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 0001254908 (Washington, D.C., 1984), 1. 
22 
 
Operation Torch. The coordination of the OSS and the US Military for these actions shows how 
crucial the relationship was. 
The content of the memoranda also reveals significant information about psychological 
warfare protocols that the OSS followed during Operation Torch. The extensive use and 
promotion of propaganda, including radio broadcasts, distribution of leaflets, proclamations, and 
slogans, shows how the OSS thought it would be best to communicate political messages and 
ideas. Giving away free food and supplies with slogans on them reveals the types of operations 
that the OSS believed would win the hearts and minds of the native population. Techniques of 
counterpropaganda illustrate how vigilant the OSS was in its anticipation of enemy efforts to 
perform similar actions. There is no doubt that the OSS or the CIA would utilize similar 
psychological protocols for future operations. 
The memoranda also demonstrate the techniques and protocols that the OSS utilized to 
initiate a coup d’état against the Vichy leadership in the Maghreb. The documents outline 
discussions with French Separatist leaders, including the conditions of the French Separatists for 
participation in the coup d’état. The OSS followed up on these recommendations by showing the 
significant value that the Separatists could provide to Operation Torch. The communication and 
cooperation with the French Separatists in these documents illustrate how the OSS and the CIA 
could and would operate in future coups and insurrection operations.  
The “Plan for North Africa” was one of just many documents within a large collection of 
internal OSS documents. For example, a different collection of memoranda labeled “North 
African Operations” contains documents from June 1942, predating the “Plan for North Africa.” 
In this “North African Operations” document, Col. Eddy lists his initial recommendations and 
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operational summaries for North Africa.42 He also mentions his request of funds for Moroccan 
operations, a summary of Germans in Morocco, and details about airfields and population 
sentiment.43 These recommendations would later be woven into the “Plan for North Africa.” 
There are also documents from the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee which lay out 
preparations and recommendations for Operation Torch. For example, in July 1942, Colonel 
Bentley, military attaché in Tangier, believed that an economic plan would tend to keep “the 
Arabs from revolt” and allow U.S. officers to move freely in North Africa.44 These are all 
examples of elements that would later be finalized in the “Plan for North Africa.” This shows 
that plans and preparations for Operation Torch began early in 1942 and evolved over a course of 
months. This process for establishing psychological warfare operations and propaganda began 
with this planning for Operation Torch. Yet, even after the “Plan for North Africa” was 
introduced, changes were implemented, and new recommendations were offered. For example, a 
document titled “Intelligence Priorities for North Africa” represents a number of documents from 
October 1942 which describe the declarations the United States would make to the French to 
inform them about Operation Torch.45  
As the “Plan for North Africa” became finalized, the OSS released specific operating 
instructions to all the individuals who would be involved. Of course, this stage of preparation 
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lasted all the way up until the initial landings in November 1942. One document titled “O.S. 
Standard Operation Instructions” represents a collection of documents referencing everything 
from military tribunals for enemy combatants in North Africa to code tables that the Allied Force 
would use to communicate.46 Because the extremely detailed document is almost 300 pages long, 
it is not possible to fully analyze all its contents, but some important elements can be mentioned. 
From this document, one can see that the OSS sought to devise contingencies for possible events 
and outcomes that would result from the invasion of Operation Torch, with its list of general 
orders and its establishment of priority objectives and corresponding actions.47 This document 
also shows just how much intelligence the OSS was able to gather on North Africa. For example, 
the OSS relied on resistance groups in North Africa to assist them in the invasion. This document 
shows the specific groups by name, size, and capabilities:  
Medjez-El-Bab – group of about 800 Europeans (4 non-coms and 8 soldiers) and some 
natives; Cousin’s group composed of 60 natives already organized among whom are 5 
veterans and 2 non-coms (French) material 5 Lebels and 4000 catridges; one group Y 
including 3 Europeans and 30 natives and one group Z about same strength as Y. 3 
Groups of Europeans and natives distributed between Medjez-El-Babe and Testour. 1 
group at Montamard. 1 group at Kaar Tir – native group without Europeans on a native’s 
property. 2 groups at Testour European and natives who know the location of arms and 
munition depots in the region.48 
This example shows the extensive intelligence capabilities of the OSS and willingness to work 
with local resistance groups to accomplish their objectives. Like other aspects of the preparations 
for Operation Torch, the OSS would use this method of conducting intelligence on local 
resistance groups in their future missions and efforts to disrupt enemy morale and conduct 
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psychological warfare. Again, however, these standard operating instructions were just one of 
many documents that were released, revised, and re-implemented. This evolving process of 
recommendations and preparations utilized to plan Operation Torch would later offer U.S. 
intelligence officials blueprints for other subsequent operations. In that sense, Operation Torch 
and North Africa were the testing ground for the OSS and American psychological warfare 
overall.49 
To be clear, the “Plan for North Africa” was a plan and just that. Some aspects of the 
elaborate preparations enumerated in the memoranda did not all come to fruition. Neither did 
every part of the operation go according to those plans. For example, in Algiers, the OSS failed 
to supply cases of Sten guns, revolvers, and plastic explosives, which Robert Murphy had 
promised, yet despite this, several hundred young supporters of the underground (many of them 
pro-Gaullist) seized the key positions in the city and awaited the arrival of American troops.50 
Robert Murphy was a career diplomat for the U.S. Department of State, who in 1941, became 
President Roosevelt’s special representative in French North Africa.51 Unfortunately, the 
American troops were late. On the Moroccan and Algerian coasts, American soldiers landed at 
the wrong spots and did not reach their targets until hours later, which meant that the pro-Allied 
general in Morocco was arrested by Vichy police.52 It seems that the young French patriots in 
Algiers were also captured. Thus, the landing aspect of Operation Torch did not go according to 
plan as American soldiers encountered active opposition from the French. 
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While the landing aspects of the plan did not go smoothly, there were also problems with 
the support from key individuals in the Vichy government. Vichy collaborator Admiral Darlan 
appeared in Algiers, which presented a problem. Admiral Darlan was a self-declared protector of 
French interests in North Africa who appointed General Giraud and his commander-in-chief and 
based his authority on Marshal Petain, whom he assumed was unable to command on his own.53 
During the landing, General Giraud was not in Algiers, but he finally arrived 36 hours late. 
Murphy discovered that he could not command the support of the pro-Vichy commanders who 
had already overwhelmed the insurgents.54 Eventually, Darlan agreed to a ceasefire in Algiers on 
November 8, 1942. It seems that in this case as in the case of the landings, the OSS had wrongly 
counted on the support of French commanders because they assumed that support for the Vichy 
regime was slimmer that it appears to have been.55 The goal of the plan for North Africa was 
accomplished, however, despite the significant complications that occurred. This only showed 
the OSS that while elaborate planning and preparation for operations and psychological warfare 
was necessary, there were no guarantees when it came to execution. 
On the other hand, a great deal of the preparations in the plan for North Africa were 
implemented as devised. For example, the OSS desired to establish a clandestine network of 
radio sites across North Africa for communication and propaganda purposes. Robert Murphy and 
Eddy were able to accomplish this aspect of the plan without a hitch.56 Plans also called for 
connections and relationships with underground contacts and sources who could provide 
 
53 Central Intelligence Agency. OSS - Relations between Moslems and Americans in North Africa/Mistakes Made in 
Working with the French and Resistance Groups in North Africa/Factual Account of the Night of 7-8 November 
1942 in Algiers/French Memorandum on Questions/Concern, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100440008-8 (Washington, 
D.C., 1943), 57. 
54 Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, 60. 
55 Arthur Layton Funk, The Politics of Torch: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch, 1942 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1974), 223. 
56 Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 155. 
27 
 
valuable information in preparation for Operation Torch. As it happens, one example is that the 
OSS developed a relationship with an underground contact called "Strings," a head of a powerful 
religious brotherhood in northern Morocco, whose sect numbered tens of thousands of “Moors” 
in all walks of life, each sworn to obey their sheikh.57 The OSS paid “Strings” fifty thousand 
francs to furnish reports from various sheiks, from shepherds who relayed relevant local 
information, and also from holy men who penetrated areas forbidden by the French authorities to 
the general populace.58 Another example of items in the plan that went according to plan was the 
acquiring of specialists in North Africa. These individuals, such as the hydrographer requested 
by General Patton, were secretly exfiltrated by shipping them in Portuguese boats at night or on 
British boats sailing from Tangier to Gibraltar.59 Along the same note, this ability of the OSS and 
Donovan to acquire individuals for their specialized skill set would not be limited to 
hydrographers; Donovan would also request individuals from different government departments 
to work in overseas locations if it benefited the organization, such as a transfer for a treasury 
department employee to work in Lisbon in November 1942.60 
 While not everything went according to plan, the OSS’s ability to adapt and respond to 
changing circumstances along with intense preparation provided the foundational template for 
OSS operations for the rest of World War II and beyond. Operation Torch was the first major 
operation of the OSS and showed how effective American psychological warfare could 
significantly impact military operational objectives and further American interests abroad. 
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 Because Operation Torch was so significant as the first major operation of the OSS, the 
OSS conducted reviews of its efforts and sought to improve on any instances where it had failed. 
This review also provided the OSS the opportunity to establish memoranda and orders that were 
issued for Operation Torch as templates for future operations. For example, certain aspects of 
preparation went on to remain relatively similar for all operations, like the procurement of 
weapons, materials, and supplies. The procedures for this procurement were laid out by the 
JPWC in December 1942, to be used as a template for future operations, like much of the 
intelligence and psychological warfare efforts would be in the coming few years.61  
 Memoranda on procurement were not the only takeaways that the OSS produced from 
Operation Torch. In March 1943, William Donovan requested Wallace Deuel to review the 
reports from North Africa and compile lessons to be learned for future operations.62 Wallace 
Deuel had become William Donovan’s special assistant in 1942 before being tasked to write a 
history of the OSS in September 1943; he would later become the special assistant to the U.S. 
Political Advisor to the Supreme Allied Headquarters.63 In his memorandum to William 
Donovan on March 15, 1943, Deuel noted that landing military officers were unaware of OSS-
brokered arrangements and were sometimes unwilling to accept the judgement of OSS agents 
during the execution of the operation not to mention that many of the officers were not fluent in 
French and could not speak with locals.64 Deuel suggested that these issues could be addressed 
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through the Joint Chiefs of Staff since many of the problems were related to the allied military 
officers leading the landings.65  
Deuel’s findings were very similarly matched with those described by Major D. W. King, 
who worked in the OSS North Africa section. Major King particularly mentioned that the Army 
G-2 unit, in addition to the landing officers, did not speak French and had never been to the 
country before.66 Major King also seemed to reference a memorandum dated March 1, 1943, 
titled “Political Policy in North Africa,” which explained lessons to be learned from OSS 
experiences in North Africa. This memorandum mentioned that future operations should utilize 
“trained American administrators and intelligence officers to supervise political affairs” as well 
as “thorough knowledge of the local situation and of the reliability of local personnel with whom 
cooperation is planned.”67 The memorandum states that there was no program for removing 
“notoriously pro-Vichy and pro-Axis groups and individuals from positions of power,” for 
freeing and using “individuals and groups who had consistently served the Allied cause,” and for 
establishing “in North Africa a regime that could arouse the enthusiasm of those elements in 
occupied countries who are resisting the Axis.”68 Major King and Wallace Deuel read reports 
from Operation Torch and were well aware of its exact execution. These reports also contained 
information about U.S. army soldiers in Morocco in the aftermath of Operation Torch. 
Apparently, a well-informed French woman from Rabat wrote a letter describing how American 
soldiers were very easy-going compared to their German counterparts; it seems that the 
American soldiers lacked hierarchical relationships and would gossip with locals, even drinking 
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heavily.69 These reports certainly gave the OSS writers and leaders a seemingly interesting 
opinion of U.S. soldiers, which is perhaps why much of the “problems with Operation Torch” 
came to be related to Allied military soldiers and officers. Yet, these memoranda and reports by 
Major King and others constituted the formal feedback system that the OSS utilized, that 
William Donovan utilized, to make the organization better for future operations. They were 
surprisingly thorough and honest, given that they were written by an all-OSS group. While the 
OSS was able to learn much about conducting operations from Operation Torch, the OSS learned 
how North Africa itself was also very important. 
Following Operation Torch, a number of planning concepts developed. North Africa 
became crucial for the OSS and American psychological warfare overall. The establishment of 
source contacts, radio broadcast networks, and government officials meant that North Africa was 
a valuable intelligence hub and one that could be used to further OSS objectives in other areas of 
its responsibility. In fact, some in the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee expressed that 
North Africa had a need for special operations as it could be used as a place of preparation for 
similar operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean. One way that this could occur would be to 
establish a training school, which would allow for quicker training of OSS agents.70 The 
Committee also desired to establish new activities for the OSS that would expand its roles and 
functions.71 This desire to expand jurisdiction would lead to conflict with other U.S. intelligence 
agencies in 1943. 
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Tensions between the OSS and OWI over Jurisdiction 
 The end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 would mark significant change for U.S. 
psychological warfare. Leaders in Washington, D.C. decided to establish new units and new 
divisions of responsibility. For example, in December 1942, the first psychological warfare units 
in the U.S. army were created with the establishment of the 1st and 2nd Radio Service Sections, 
forming the 1st Combat Propaganda Company.72 On December 23, 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued JCS 155/4/D, which abolished the JPWC and gave the OSS a new directive: "planning, 
developing, coordinating, and executing the military program of psychological warfare" and "the 
compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic information as may be 
required by military operations."73 Because of this new JCS order, the Army dissolved its 
psychological warfare branch since the OSS gained control over propaganda. That did not mean 
the end of the Army’s involvement in psychological warfare matters, however.  
 Unfortunately, the new JCS directive (155/4/D), did not solve all the problems of 
jurisdiction that had arisen. It simply established the responsibility for securing OWI cooperation 
on a higher echelon – that of the JCS – yet this did not solve the fundamental issue of military 
coordination.74 The directive instituted a planning group for psychological warfare that 
supervised and coordinated major projects and plans between the OSS and other agencies, along 
with an advisory committee.75 Following the directive, a new General Order No. 9, released 
January 3, 1943, set in place the new reorganization of the OSS. New branches and 
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administrative functions were created, along with new deputy directors, who alleviated Donovan 
of the numerous matters he had to personally sign off on.  
 While the new reorganization ameliorated internal OSS administration issues, the 
problems of demarcation of operations between the OWI and the OSS continued. It seems that 
Elmer Davis, the head of the OWI, met with Donovan on multiple occasions in the beginning of 
1943 to try and work out these problems but they accomplished nothing. In the meantime, Elmer 
Davis and other OWI officials threatened President Roosevelt with their resignation since the 
JCS directive 155/4/D had given the OSS supervision of psychological warfare while also stating 
their case for the civilian control of propaganda and psychological warfare. From January to 
March, efforts to militarize the OSS, promote Donovan to brigadier general, and arbitrate 
responsibilities between the military and the JCS, all resulted in recommendations but no 
concrete action. In early March, Admiral Leahy, Chairman of the JCS, submitted a proposed 
order to President Roosevelt, subject to the understanding that JCS 155/4/D would be revised.76  
 Finally, on March 9, 1943, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9312, which 
established that the OWI would be the agency to conduct foreign information and white (overt) 
propaganda while also declaring that all operations abroad should be coordinated with military 
plans and be approved by the JCS and the theatre commander.77 Of course, this relatively vague 
order left much still up to question. Executive Order 9312 did not explicitly define the role of the 
OWI for black propaganda, subversive activities, or coordination of psychological warfare, 
which meant that the President had still not drawn solid boundaries between the agencies.78 With 
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the President’s new order, however, the JCS had to revise its original December 155/4/D 
directive. Thus, on April 4, 1943, they released JCS 155/7/D which revised 155/4/D by merely 
eliminating references to the OWI from its text, which essentially defined psychological warfare 
as everything except propaganda.79 While this seemed to eliminate control of propaganda from 
the OSS, it ensured that the OSS had a mandate to continue in its psychological warfare 
operations. While this did not provide the OSS and OWI the clear demarcations that the agencies 
desired in terms of roles and responsibilities of operations, it did seem to put all control under the 
military theatre commanders for any operations conducted in their area of responsibility. This 
meant that civilian U.S. intelligence agencies had to cooperate with the local military 
commanders to conduct their efforts in the field, yet the JCS still required that operations be 
approved through them.80  
 On June 12, 1943, Donovan sent the JCS a field manual on psychological warfare which 
acted as a formal statement on OSS doctrine, operations, and procedures; however, this field 
manual was opposed by General Strong, the head of U.S. Army G-2’s intelligence group, as well 
as by internal OSS employees who viewed it as harsh and “devoid of moral considerations.”81 
Because of the backlash, the JCS ordered Donovan to submit a new draft that would alleviate 
instances where the OSS was already conducting operations that were not allowed under the 
previous JCS 155/7/D.82 Finally, after a new draft of the field manual was submitted in 
September and recommendations were made, the JCS published JCS 155/11/D on October 26, 
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1943.83 Being the final directive in the 155 series and final basic directive for the OSS, it 
contained several key changes, including changing the term “psychological warfare operations” 
to “strategic services operations,” which entailed everything except activities of the federal radio, 
press, and publication services.84 This provided the OSS with authorization for many of its new 
activities, including those to take place in Latin America and the Far East. Shortly after the final 
JCS 155/11/D directive, a new propaganda branch was established in Army G-2 by Military 
Intelligence Division Directive No. 78 to coordinate propaganda functions for the War 
Department and theatre commanders while interacting with the OWI, OSS, and CIAA.85  
 It should also be mentioned that JCS issued a separate directive dealing with intelligence 
collection. On August 5, 1943, JCS established Joint U.S. Army-Navy Intelligence Collection 
Agencies (JICAs) in the North African, Middle Eastern, and India-China-Myanmar theaters, 
although China would later become its own theater.86 Each JICA was then attached to its 
respective theater as a separate section and conducted the coordination of intelligence activities 
within that theater; it then collected that information and forwarded it to Washington to pertinent 
departments. Yet, theater intelligence activities diminished, leading authorities to liquidate JICA 
agencies two years later in August 1945.87 
 All these jurisdictional matters are very important to take note of because they greatly 
influenced the abilities of the OSS from 1942 to 1945 to perform certain radio propaganda or 
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psychological warfare efforts. The delegation of psychological warfare abilities between mainly 
the OSS, OWI, and the Army’s Psychological Warfare Branch, ensured that certain operations 
would be performed over others from 1943 to 1945. One can imagine that when the Morale 
Operations section of the OSS was created in January 1943, it encountered many problems and 
had trouble expanding with all the tensions over jurisdiction. While these jurisdictional matters 
were being sorted out in Washington, D.C., agents from the Morale Operations Section began 
















Morale Operations in 1943 
 Carleton Coon, a notable anthropologist-turned-OSS-agent associated with Harvard and 
later with the University of Pennsylvania, stated in his book, A North Africa Story: The 
Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-43, that psychological warfare and printed propaganda 
efforts during and just following Operation Torch were almost useless because the “Arabs either 
could not understand or did not consider [the majority of the printed propaganda] funny;” this 
was true for the propaganda of the British and the Germans as well.88 Of course, Operation Torch 
was the first significant operation of the OSS, showing the relative inexperience of the OSS at 
creating believable propaganda. The lessons that the OSS learnt from Operation Torch, however, 
propelled the OSS and its Morale Operations group to produce more and more sophisticated 
propaganda efforts, which this section will highlight. The Morale Operations section was tasked 
in accordance with the order of its creation to accomplish the following: 
[I]ncite and spread dissension, confusion and disorder within enemy countries, and to 
promote subversive activities against enemy governments. In enemy-occupied or 
controlled countries, it was to encourage and support resistance to the enemy. Secret 
propaganda by radio and word of mouth (e.g., rumor), or hand to hand by pamphlets, 
leaflets, pictures, etc., as well as the manipulation of individuals or groups, were set forth 
as the methods necessary to accomplish these aims.89 
With Morale Operations given its new mission, it began to establish branches in other overseas 
locations and to set up local field representatives, yet it encountered internal problems since 
many of its agents departed for other offices or branches due to changes in assignments, leaving 
offices with a continually rotating queue of leadership.90  
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 Morale Operations mostly focused on the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, but it is 
important to note that the OSS was also conducting other intelligence operations. In one case, for 
example, the submarine Casabianca inserted an agent named “Tommy” into France in February 
1943, where he secured German plans for anti-aircraft defenses of France and was subsequently 
retrieved via the same submarine.91 Nevertheless, the plans for the psychological warfare efforts 
for the invasion of Sicily, code-named Operation Husky, continued to change based on shifting 
estimates of possible Italian resistance and “differing attitudes toward, and interpretations of, the 
policy of unconditional surrender adopted by FDR and Churchill at the Casablanca conference in 
January 1943.” But the policy on surrender was not the only thing that influenced Italians. POW 
interrogations revealed that Italian soldiers were likely to keep Allied leaflets. They were also 
more likely to be influenced by U.S. slogans and phrases emphasizing Italian emigration to 
America and lack of German care for Italians.92  
Generally speaking, rumors are most effective and circulate most rapidly in atmospheres 
of crisis and emergency where there is no clear picture of the situation and official news is 
lacking.93 The OSS knew this fact and recognized the opportunity to use it on the Italians. In 
April 1943, it sent out the first rumors. Morale Operations sent out a rumor that Mussolini had 
applied to the Swiss for asylum in case of an Allied invasion and was denied, which eventually 
reached a U.S. representative in Bern.94 In June, MO established the first “black” radio in 
Tunisia, called “Italo Balbo,” which consisted of an Italian speaker attempting to promote 
discord between Fascists and Nazis by spreading rumors; it was very effective since Italian 
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POWs captured later were surprised to hear that the station was a front for circulating 
falsehoods.95  
There was also a heavy emphasis on leaflets leading up to the invasion of Sicily. 
Apparently, by June 1943, about ten million leaflets were produced in North Africa that were 
then dropped over Sicilian, Sardinian, and other Italian towns. These leaflets mentioned the 
strong air power of the Allies and warned civilians to keep away from military targets, as well as 
reproducing speeches of Allied leaders.96 Altogether, the leaflets, the rumors, and the radio 
broadcasts ensured that the invasion of Sicily was a success: Sicily, Corsica, and the outlying 
islands fell to the Allies with ease.97 It seems that unlike Operation Torch, Operation Husky went 
very much according to plan thanks to the effective efforts of the OSS.98 This success suggests 
that the OSS learned from its mistakes in Operation Torch and implemented significant planning 
and psychological warfare efforts to achieve better results in Sicily. Sicily would not be the only 
place that the OSS was conducting psychological warfare efforts in 1943, however.  
In mid-1943, Morale Operations began conducting operations in the Far East, specifically 
trying to influence populations and efforts in Ceylon (Sri-Lanka), Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, 
Vietnam, and China. 99 Many of the OSS individuals in Morale Operations trained near 
Washington to write slogans and leaflets for use against the Japanese. MO had access to 
Japanese POWs in rural Virginia that they would bounce ideas off in their training. These 
captured Japanese soldiers would tell the Morale Operations personnel that many of the leaflets 
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they created would not be understood by the average Japanese soldier since many could not even 
write their own name at a time when literacy rates were quite limited. They thus implored the 
OSS to write simple, short written pieces. The same was true for slogans. In the case of slogans, 
the POWs advocated that writing about killing their commanding officers was a futile effort. 
Many esteemed women taught these courses, such as anthropologist Margaret Mead, whose 
husband was Gregory Bateson.100 Gregory Bateson was a renowned member of Morale 
Operations, who spent much of his time designing and implementing black propaganda radio 
broadcast primarily for efforts in Myanmar, Thailand, China, and India.101  
At the same time that Morale Operations were being established in the Far-East, activities 
in the Middle East were also accelerating. For example, the OSS issued a report in August 1943 
mentioning intelligence regarding the Zionist-Arab problem, landing of Nazi parachutists in Iraq, 
Iranian political parties and communications, and information on Syria and Lebanon.102 These 
intelligence efforts led to Morale Operations designing rumors and other subversive materials to 
disrupt Axis Middle East operations. It seemed that these efforts were successful. In a later OSS 
report from December 1943, it appears that MO agents disseminated rumors in November for 
German soldiers in the Middle East, primarily in Egypt. These rumors mentioned how the Allies 
were treating German POWs or deserters in Turkey well, even letting them out on parole, and 
giving them jobs, such as driving cars. These rumors were known to have been effective because 
“two German filers, departing from Crete, gave themselves up as prisoners of war” thinking that 
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they would enjoy good conditions.103 This is remarkable because it shows how the OSS was 
becoming increasingly effective and creative in its psychological warfare and propaganda.  
 With the invasion of Sicily a success, and Morale Operations expanded to a number of 
overseas theaters, the capture of Italy was naturally the next step. Thus, the OSS was already 
planning and implementing psychological warfare efforts for the Italian mainland. While 
Mussolini’s government did not need to be discredited through broadcasting or leaflets because 
Italians already reviled it widely, the OSS figured that it could still create a divide between the 
Italians and the Germans who were occupying the northern four-fifths of the country.104 Thus, 
the OSS bombarded Italians with further leaflets, not ones just explaining Allied power as 
previous ones did, but ones that pointed out disparities between Italian and German rations, 
incidents of German and Italian military clashes, German stores overflowing with Italian goods, 
and instances where Germany bolstered its own defense at the Italians’ expenses.105 While these 
leaflet droppings certainly made an impact, broadcasts continued to serve as another means of 
destroying German and Italian morale and encouraging defections. These operations continued 
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Morale Operations in 1944 
 It seems that 1944 was the year when the Morale Operations Division of the OSS took its 
propaganda and psychological warfare efforts to its maximum potential. While Morale 
Operations influenced groups in various parts of the globe, this study compares the three most 
significant theaters of operations: Europe, Middle East, and Far East. It should be noted that this 
study uses the term Far East as an all-encompassing term to describe the areas of OSS China 
covered in the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) as well as the operations 
generally considered as Far East, such as Burma. SACO was an agreement that William 
Donovan reached with the Chinese in April 1943.106 The agreement named General Tai Li as 
director of SACO and Milton E. Miles as deputy director, who was also named Far East chief of 
the OSS.107 Nevertheless, a number of declassified OSS “Monthly Activity Reports” describe the 
status and accomplishments of the various OSS divisions each month in 1944. Through these 
reports, it is possible to see just how sophisticated operations became. The OSS used a variety of 
propaganda efforts, especially leaflet dropping, radio broadcasting, newspaper and magazine 
distribution, and applications of poison-pen letters.   
 For the European theater of operations, Morale Operations began in February 1944. The 
OSS monthly activity report from February describes a mission known as “Sioux Mission,” 
which proved to be useful as an effective way in which the OSS could approach Germany 
through Sweden with its Morale Operations. The specifics of the mission are never mentioned, 
but it seems the mission was cleared with the acting chief of the north Europe section of the U.S. 
State Department. Since the U.S. Ambassador Herschel Johnson was in Stockholm, the OSS 
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made a note that he was to be informed in person of the mission.108 This appears to be evidence 
of increasing transparency and cooperation with other US officials from years past since the 
mission occurred on a modest scale. In March, there seemed to be a slowdown of operations due 
to the lack of manpower and staffing issues since the OSS dispersed much of the Morale 
Operations staff to other areas and on other missions.109 
By April 1944, however, operations ran full steam ahead. A two-man MO unit arrived in 
Stockholm where they began production of some 250,000 pamphlets, leaflets, stickers, posters, 
and letters for distribution through Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. They also 
produced and distributed the Harvard Project Newsletter, Handel und Wandel (“Trade and 
Change”), which was a weekly business publication containing largely financial news, angled 
from a German industry perspective. It hoped to encourage German businessmen to act out 
against Nazi leaders so that Allied interests would cooperate with them.110 The OSS also started 
one of its biggest radio programs in April. The OSS took over the most popular MO station of 
the war, Soldatensender Calais (“Soldier Transmission Calais”), which was initially a British 
program. The broadcasts came from a 600,000-watt radio transmitter in Woburn, England. It 
delivered news, music, nostalgic stories, and anti-Nazi propaganda. It even had a special music 
department that wrote "black" lyrics for German and American songs for performance by 
Marlene Dietrich, Bing Crosby, and Dinah Shore; these new compositions were made especially 
for Soldatensender.111 Apparently, the programs were so popular that one female host received 
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fan mail and requests for pictures through the mail. It was also so effective that the German 
propaganda ministry and military high command issued repeated warnings to soldiers and 
civilians not to listen to Soldatensender, with even Joseph Goebbels recognizing its potential 
negative effects.112  
Newspapers also became a powerful MO Europe tool. The OSS printed daily “gray” 
papers, which were distributed by air over the German troops. Along with these gray 
newspapers, Morale Operations wrote black propaganda to maintain liaisons with the French 
resistance groups in April; some of this material was subversive, but it any case, the OSS 
distributed it over German troops for demoralizing effects.113 French Resistance groups were 
known as Maquis, which literally means “men of the underbrush,” referring to the high dense 
shrubbery covering the sides of the Corsican mountains.114 In May, Morale Operations produced 
millions of magazines (similar to American weeklies) and pamphlets supposedly from 
underground groups. Fortunately, the OSS determined that Germans were unlikely to tell the 
difference between real and “black” magazines. The OSS airdropped fake issues of Time and 
Life magazines, which contained stories by POWs describing the comforts of American 
internment while also encouraging enemy surrender. Some of these underground newspapers 
were called La Ricossa and Marc Aurelio for Italians; for the Germans and Austrians, it was Das 
Neue Deutsch (“The New German”) and Der Osterreicher (“The Austrian”). Even more, the 
OSS issued forged copies of Himler’s SS newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps (“The Black Corps”), 
and issues of the Berlin newspaper, Illustrierte Zeitung (“Illustrated Newspaper”).115 Another 
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subversive newspaper the OSS produced was Nachrichten fur die Truppe (“News for the 
Troops”), specifically for the Wehrmacht, which hoped to demoralize German soldiers. During 
May, the OSS was still developing many more projects and magazines, even French-language 
publications for resistance groups and Vichy collaborators.116 
In June, much of the focus remained on D-Day, otherwise known as Operation Overlord. 
The D-Day invasion, June 6, 1944, was the largest amphibious invasion in history, with 175,000 
American, British, and Canadian troops landing in Normandy that day. These would be followed 
by hundreds of thousands of additional Allied soldiers later. While not directly related to Morale 
Operations, the individuals known as Jedburghs were very important in Operation Overlord. 
Jedburghs was the code name for about one hundred three-man teams drawn from the United 
States, Great Britain, and France, and it always included at least one native-speaking Frenchman. 
These Allied teams led the Maquis in the disruption of enemy communications, attacks on troop 
movements, and raids on enemy headquarters, which bolstered Allied advances and hindered 
German resistance.117 Of course, with the benefit of hindsight from Operation Torch, OSS 
officials began conducting propaganda and psychological warfare efforts for months leading up 
to Operation Overlord and the months after it. They learned just how effective planning and 
preparation were in a massive operation such as this.  
Yet, Operation Overlord did not stop the OSS from producing more and more 
propaganda in June. For example, MO released a poster campaign titled Wie Lange Noch? 
(“How much longer?”) which was a series of sixteen different posters each with a red circle and 
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three extended fingers forming a “W.”118 This was in hopes to provide evidence that a strong 
underground movement operated inside Germany. The OSS printed more than 130,000 leaflets 
by June. Many of the posters showed how Nazis were taking the best of the food and women. It 
also deceived Germans into thinking secret weapons were fake and that Allied bombing was 
making life impossible.119 At the same time, Morale Operations produced weekly magazines for 
French Resistance groups as well as those that had a thin cover of pure entertainment for a 
subversive article. The OSS also distributed leaflets intending to destroy enemy morale to 
German soldiers in Norway.120 
Following the July 20, 1944, coup attempt against Hitler, Soldatensender broadcast the 
names of hundreds of Germans who were allegedly involved in the plot. Morale Operations 
sought to use this moment to implicate as many people as possible, guilty or innocent, so that 
they could eliminate the most capable people in Germany. It seems that even the Gestapo took 
Soldatensender information seriously. The OSS changed the Soldatensender program name to 
“Joker” in the fall. Under the new Joker name, they resurrected Gen. Ludwig Beck, the former 
German army chief of staff, who had committed suicide following the failed summer coup. Joker 
broadcasted a voice that sounded like Beck’s, which demanded that Germans kill Hitler and 
overthrow the Nazis.121 It should be noted that the Nazis continuously jammed the Joker 
frequency since it was especially popular. Apparently, ninety percent of POWs taken in the 
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summer of 1944 said they had listened to Soldatensender or Joker broadcasts, implying that 
German officers had their hands full trying to prevent their troops from listening in.122 
In the wake of the failed July 20th coup, the OSS instituted Operation Sauerkraut. Its goal 
was to attack the morale of the German army by circulating rumors, fake orders, and leaflets 
about growing unrest among German military leaders. The OSS selected prisoners and dressed 
them in German uniforms with the proper insignia. It gave them forged identity papers, firearms 
with ammunition, survival supplies, and 3,000 pieces of MO material. Morale Operations 
instructed these prisoners to distribute the propaganda by nailing it to trees, leaving it in 
buildings, or scattering it through the streets. In addition to spreading the propaganda, the 
returning prisoners were able to bring back significant intelligence, including the location of 
German troops.123 Barbara Lauwers was a significant agent in Operation Sauerkraut. She 
received the Bronze Star for her work in securing the surrender of 600 Czechoslovakian troops 
through black propaganda. Lauwers wrote five speeches from "fellow Czechs" who had 
supposedly defected and now worked with the Allies in Italy. Lauwers also disseminated a 
simple surrender pass “good for one return trip to Czechoslovakia via Allied lines.” BBC 
broadcasted these speeches to Czechs in northern Italy, and as a result, six hundred Czech 
soldiers surrendered carrying these passes.124 
At the same time that the OSS was carrying out sophisticated propaganda efforts across 
Europe in July, OSS operators – Jedburgh liberators – made their way through France traveling 
with the Maquis to liberate small villages and towns. Michael Burke, a 26-year-old football star 
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from the University of Pennsylvania was told by an eighty-year-old Frenchman, who had tears in 
his eyes, that he sobbed “to think that Gen. Eisenhower thought enough of our little village to 
send an American officer here to help us.”125 While these actions did not disrupt enemy morale, 
they certainly gained the support of the local population, which the OSS learned from Operation 
Torch in North Africa. 
Towards the end of July, the OSS applied somewhat new psychological warfare 
practices. Morale Operations utilized public address systems on sound trucks to broadcast 
propaganda, which enabled a number of Germans to surrender in the Bayoux area in France and 
later another 600 Germans surrendered to similar persuasion.126 Morale Operations also utilized 
artillery weapons to fire tactical leaflets produced by mobile printing units. In one instance under 
Captain Patrick Dolan, this resulted in the capture of 1200 Germans. The OSS also began 
producing leaflets and news magazines in additional languages, not just German and French: 
they produced leaflets in Russian and Polish.127 The OSS continued utilizing new methods and 
practices in August. Morale Operations designed a leaflet for German frontline troops on the 
Eighth Army front in the form of a Feld post (V-mail letter or circular) which supposedly came 
from the "League for Lonely Women.” Apparently, soldiers on furlough only needed to pin an 
entwined heart symbol (given in the leaflet) on their lapels to find a girlfriend. The leaflet ended 
with the line: "Don't be shy. Your wife, sister and sweetheart are one of us. We think of you, but 
we think also of Germany."128  
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At the same time, the OSS received authorization to establish its own “black” radio 
station in Paris named Volksender Drei. Morale Operations intended to capitalize on fears of 
impending destruction of family and home by spreading rumors of terror, which would manifest 
itself in internal revolt. Volksender Drei broadcast in German, with its chief speaker purportedly 
being the commander of an unknown town in the path of the Allied advance. The program 
achieved great success. It headlined in all French newspapers.129 Apparently, two thousand 
German POW's who listened to the program believed it “meant the end of Germany.” It was also 
so sophisticated that the U.S. 12th Army Group radio operators who picked up the broadcasts 
considered the news so important that high ranking U.S. Army officers, including General 
Bradley, were aroused from bed to hear about it. Of course, the OSS had not informed the U.S. 
Army about the broadcasts for security reasons. The Germans repeatedly tried to jam the 
program.130 All these factors showed just how effective the program was, so much so in fact that 
even Army radio operators thought it was real. Problems with propaganda believability remained 
an issue following Operation Torch, but Volksender Drei showed just how far the OSS had 
come. Even with the radio success, Morale Operations increased their leaflet output substantially 
in August. To give an idea of the progress, MO completed 30 different subversive leaflets 
programs in August alone. There were also negotiations to establish more secret radio facilities 
in Paris, which was not surprising given the success of Volksender Drei.131 
In September 1944, the Allies captured Luxembourg City, which gave the OSS the use of 
the most powerful commercial transmitter in Europe. While Allied propagandists pushed out 
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"white" propaganda during day-time broadcasts, MO ran a nightly program named Operation 
Annie. It was also called “1212” after its frequency. The program supposedly came from a 
German resistance group. What is special about Operation Annie is that it utilized a unique 
strategy of initially providing detailed and truthful news to build up audience trust and then 
beginning to insert false reports, orders, and rumors to create chaos.132 One particular example of 
this is when the station was able to divert a few German Army trucks to a route leading behind 
American lines and that resulted in their capture.133 By all accounts, Radio Luxembourg was a 
huge success. It continued to produce programming well into November. By that time, it was on 
the air a total of eleven hours daily, including seven relays from New York, twenty-three relays 
from BBC, and four relays from American Broadcasting Station in Europe.134 
Yet again, the success of radio broadcasts did not mean Morale Operations reduced its 
printed propaganda efforts. In fact, it was quite the contrary. Morale Operations disseminated 
two hundred sixty-two thousand leaflets and stickers to the field and made arrangements for the 
transmission of other leaflets to Prince Bernhardt, who was the leader of the Dutch 
underground.135 During September, one million copies of the August 15th edition of Das Neue 
Deutsch were printed in miniature and dropped over German territory by air.136 
While the OSS established Das Neue Deutsch before October 1944, it was in October 
that warnings from Nachrichten fur die Truppe and Himmler’s SS newspaper Das Schwarze 
Korps took the front page. Das Neue Deutsch showed itself to be highly successful, perhaps 
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because it alleged to be the instrument of a German peace party which wanted to end the war, 
liquidate the Nazi Party, and set up a new German state on democratic principles.137 It seems that 
the authentic German newspapers’ efforts to try and dissuade German soldiers from reading the 
subversive material failed because numerous POWs – a remarkable 30 to 50% of the total –
surrendered to Allied forces quoting from copies of the newspaper in their possession.138  
While Morale Operations enjoyed significant success in Europe, along with establishing 
new and more sophisticated ways to conduct psychological warfare, even ways that tricked U.S. 
Army radio operators, the end of 1944 saw a slowdown of radio broadcasts and other projects. 
For example, in November, the OSS shut down Volksender Drei.139 Of course, these are only 
examples from Europe. The OSS continued to conduct significant operations in its Middle 
Eastern theater during 1944, too. 
For the Middle Eastern theater of operations, Morale Operations began in January 1944. 
Morale Operations there sought to terrorize German garrisons while also bolstering resistance in 
Greece. One of the methods that they utilized was radio propaganda. From the Cairo office, 
which was the main hub of the OSS in the Middle East, the black radio “Morse” broadcast in 
Morse code four times nightly to Greece and the Balkans. These programs consisted of news 
reports, which were intertwined with rumors.140 This strategy proved to be effective because 
some of these rumors were published in underground newspapers. The programs were split 
between German and mostly Greek broadcasts. For example, the German broadcasts supposedly 
came from a Nazi wireless operator giving the "inside story" to fellow soldiers; for Greek, 
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Hungarian and Rumanian broadcasts, they pretended to be an underground station sending out 
the truth to resistance groups. MO terminated the Morse broadcasts in October 1944 after 
Germany withdrew troops from Greece.141 At the same time that MO broadcasted Morse starting 
in January, Cairo office also received reports that confirmed the value of the rumors and 
subversive material that were sent out. This became a standard Morale Operations practice which 
acted as a feedback loop to ensure the propaganda was successful. It was. For example, the OSS 
reported that in January alone an Austrian soldier had surrendered with six Italians from Crete.142 
In February, the Cairo office circulated rumors every week throughout the Middle 
Eastern theater, though this was mostly in Greece and the Balkan areas. These rumors were 
successful in producing riots and the surrender of individual aviators. Morale Operations also 
made arrangements so that four pages of Life magazine were reprinted and disseminated amongst 
German soldiers encouraging them to defect, referencing how good the treatment of German 
POWs was.143 There were also plans with OWI to drop special material to Yugoslav Partisans. A 
report for Prime Minister Churchill described these Partisans as those under communist 
leadership and firmly oriented towards Moscow, but also observed that as a resistance 
movement, it was highly effective and worth cultivating. This special material included news 
summaries and other American material such as the journal, Tank, in Serbo-Croat translations.144 
In March, Morale Operations work in Cairo steadily increased. Pamphlets, rumors, black 
broadcasts, and motion picture training films for Yugoslav Partisans continued to be produced. 
MO also instituted a “poison pen” letter campaign against well-known Greek quislings, with a 
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weekly series of these letters being sent to Greek newspapers.145 Poison pen letters, otherwise 
known as suspicion casting letters, are useful for driving a wedge in populations of people. They 
target specific individuals and cast doubt on or tarnish their reputation. They are most effective 
when they are essentially true since their highly personalized nature demands the use of credible 
intricate details.146 
Morale Operations Middle East saw an expansion of efforts in April 1944. With 
increasing work between MO and Yugoslav Partisans, MO established a liaison with the group. 
MO also established another “black” radio station in Palestine, which it broadcast to Hungary, 
Romania, and Greece. Interestingly, the Cairo office also produced pamphlets urging Greeks to 
attack the Germans by calling on the Hungarian underground to use labor resistance, i.e., protests 
in factories. This might be the first instance where MO called specifically for labor resistance! 
Morale Operations also began sending black material to additional cities in the Middle East: they 
sent rumors to Istanbul for distribution while also planting rumors, poison pen letters, and other 
subversive material in Greek newspapers in Alexandria.147  
Unfortunately, OSS “Monthly Activity Reports” regarding the Middle Eastern theater 
from certain months during 1944 were removed and sent to Lt. Col. Norman Newhouse, 2677th 
regiment, thus, they are consequently missing.148 The reason for this removal of specific monthly 
reports is unclear. The only thing that is clear is that the OSS designated the Mediterranean 
section as the 2677th regiment with the militarization of the OSS in 1942.149 The OSS reassigned 
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the Mediterranean section to the Africa section in May 1942.150 For clarification, these sections 
combined with the Near East section to form the Middle Eastern theater. 
For Morale Operations in the Middle East, June, August, and September of 1944 were 
busy months. For example, in June, MO dispatched special teams to Greece and Crete. One such 
team of two men traveled to Volos, where, under the care of an OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) 
team, called “Horsebreeders,” they distributed subversive MO material. The duo printed a Greek 
newspaper designed to bolster Greek morale and distributed pamphlets urging local resistance to 
the Germans. This special MO team also sent out poison-pen letters, posted fake military orders, 
and spread rumors. This is yet another example of Morale Operations agents working with other 
OSS branches to accomplish psychological warfare. In August, MO set up the black radio station 
“Boston” near Izmir with the cooperation of the Turkish secret police. It featured daily 
broadcasts of ten-minute programs from a supposed "reformed" Greek collaborationist, who was 
trying to convince his former partners that collaborating was futile.151 Owing to the success of 
the broadcasts, the Nazis frequently jammed the station and even attempted to physically 
sabotage it. Additionally, in August, OSS Monthly Activity Reports indicate that MO executed 
mission “Ulysses” on Evvia. It published two daily underground papers, one in Greek, and one in 
German. The Greek newspaper contained news broadcasts from Cairo and the German one 
contained true and false news and general subversive material. In one example of the broadcast’s 
success, a German garrison was evacuated after MO issued an ultimatum for the leader of the 
Andartes forces. This resulted in a number of Germans surrendering with MO pamphlets in their 
possession.152 Like the Morse broadcasts, the OSS discontinued the “Boston” station in October. 
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In September, MO discontinued the Greek broadcasts, but continued to produce the Hungarian 
broadcasts, along with producing a number of printed materials for Hungarian consumption.153 
While Morale Operations saw great success in the Middle Eastern theater, as evidenced 
by the number of Germans who surrendered in Greece with MO pamphlets in hand, it seems that 
the OSS utilized many of the more sophisticated psychological warfare tactics in western 
Europe. While MO did call on labor resistance through radio broadcasts as a method of 
encouraging civil revolt from psychological warfare, there was understandably not as great of a 
need for propaganda programs in the Middle Eastern theater compared to the European theater. 
While the Middle Eastern theater had a lack of opportunities compared to the OSS European 
theater, the Far Eastern theater suffered from more logistical and legal problems getting 
operations up to speed in its area of responsibility.  
For the Far Eastern theater of operations, significant Morale Operations began in January 
1944. Immediately in January, MO sought to discredit Japanese targets by increasing the number 
of subversive leaflets, making black sound recordings, and even gathering intelligence on 
deceptive media.154 In February, MO wanted to expand to Delhi but lacked the manpower to 
send even a single representative. Of course, that showed that opportunities were growing. They 
were also growing in Burma. For example, in Burma, MO sought to destroy the hold that the 
Japanese had over the population through terrorism and propaganda.155 Along with the desire to 
expand, OSS Far East officials sought to expand their use of local collaborators. According to 
Commander Edmond Taylor, a former journalist in France who wrote a book about fifth 
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columnists called, The Strategy of War, before joining the OSS, the most effective type of MO 
operation was spontaneous activity by natives.156 He argued that MO Far East should utilize 
natives and train them in MO principles and techniques. Unfortunately, the key problem that the 
Far East section faced at that time was the difficulty in acquiring key personnel with special 
knowledge of languages and areas – the very “natives” he was describing.157 
In March, the Far East continued in its preparations for executing Morale Operations 
despite its logistical challenges. MO changed from this preparation stage to an operational stage 
in April. MO produced its first black leaflets, in cooperation with OWI, and delivered them 
personally to forward to operational units and drop to others. MO supplemented these leaflets 
with a succession of rumors as well.158 It was during this time frame that specific operational 
plans were being prepared for in China, specifically the Shanghai area. An agreement was 
reached with General Tai Li and sent to Washington for approval to have American personnel at 
advance bases with the Chinese as well as to operate black radio stations together with the 
Chinese in several provinces. This agreement also gave MO the ability to install and operate 
under Sino-American control, means of printing and reproduction, along with the right to install 
separate communications, and to circulate MO communications by special codes between 
advance bases.159 
In May, to act on original intentions to undermine Japanese control over the population in 
Burma, MO processed six leaflets and a series of rumors for distribution to operating centers 
within the country for circulation. In June, MO began preparing radio receiving sets to monitor 
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enemy broadcasts on an ad-hoc basis.160 Although Morale Operations began working more 
closely with the Chinese during this time, preparing eight different propaganda projects, 
unfortunately, they encountered logistical trouble in finding qualified Chinese staff due to a lack 
of competent translators available. To try to bolster support, MO also issued a report to General 
Chiang-Kai-Shek explaining the potential usefulness of MO in the Chinese theater.161 In July, 
little changed for MO China, but in the other Far East sections MO circulated rumors and 
produced leaflet requested on the theme of “Who is your enemy?” with the help of OWI. MO 
personnel went into the field to give lectures on the value and use of MO.162 The reason that MO 
cooperated with OWI on many occasions in this theater compared to other theaters is that there 
were a limited number of “black” political targets available in Burma, so much of the 
propaganda they issued was “white.”  
In August, however, MO Far East finally found opportunities to showcase its capabilities. 
As a testament to how quickly MO could turn around leaflet requests, on one occasion, a request 
from the field was made for a leaflet urging Burmans in one section to disregard requests of a 
Japanese officer. MO printed 10,000 copies of this leaflet and disseminated them on the day 
following the request.163 On top of that, MO counteracted various rumors of enemy agents in 
China with the truth, which prevented chaos from breaking out among the local population. MO 
was also able to find more Chinese agents. For example, six Chinese students were sent into 
Canton to repeat rumors and gather intelligence. At the same time, MO received approval for 
four separate projects: JN-27, Glottis, Windpipe, and Kidney. JN-27 was a project to establish a 
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black radio station at “Camp Y” to simulate Japanese stations broadcasting to the Japanese or to 
the native peoples of occupied countries.164 In August 1944, it finally showed how MO Far East 
was gaining traction.  
September brought an expansion of Morale Operations printing. Having established 
personnel at the New Delhi location, MO began sending larger printing orders there. 
Interestingly, MO was able to recruit China’s cartoon artist, Yeh Chen Yu. Yeh produced 
pictures at the Calcutta office. At the same time, operations also continued in Canton. For 
example, MO dispatched a radio operator and a code man to Canton on September 10 to join 
operations there. They continued to spread rumors and distribute propaganda leaflets. OWI also 
disseminated weekly newssheets to a MO agent in Canton and forwarded the first batch of 1,000 
on September 15.165 Similar examples of such MO printing occurred later into 1944 as well.  
The effectiveness of the Morale Operations in the Far East is somewhat of a debate. 
While there is evidence that MO distributed vast numbers of propaganda and rumors, even 
countering enemy rumors, the Far East theater simply did not possess the same evidence of 
hundreds or thousands of enemy soldiers walking across front lines to surrender with pamphlets 
in their hands. Of course, the Far East situation was vastly different from Europe and the Middle 
East during that time. There was also a difference between the China and Burma sections of the 
Far East theater. Whereas most of the OSS military partners worked in China, Burma contained 
mostly OSS and OWI civilians.166 This discrepancy in civilian and military resources certainly 
impacted the results and emphasis on Morale Operations in the Far East. It should be noted, 
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however, that Morale Operations continued in the Pacific and Far East theater even while 
operations in the Middle East and Europe began to slow down.   
Because the purpose of this study has been to show the effects of Operation Torch as a 
foundational template for the sophistication of Morale Operations later on, this narrative 
included a few examples from across various theaters of World War II. But readers should note 
that there were many other examples as well, attesting to the importance of Operation Torch for 















The End of the OSS 
 To illustrate the far-reaching nature of the psychological warfare efforts of the OSS, 
while also suggesting its legacies for what followed, it is worth considering the end of the OSS, 
and its transition into the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.  
The majority of significant Morale Operations in the European theater ended in April 
1945 when the U.S. and Soviet forces met at Torgau, Germany.167 As for operations in the 
Middle Eastern theater, with the German retreat from Greece and the Balkan areas in October 
1944, the need for broadcasting of black propaganda from Cairo or Palestine diminished. 
Meanwhile, operations in the Far East continued until the end of World War II and the Japanese 
surrender on August 15. For example, in the late spring of 1945, Morale Operations established a 
presence on the island of Guam and issued daily black radio propaganda to the Japanese 
homeland until VJ-Day.168 
 As Morale Operations continued from 1944 until August 1945, William Donovan was 
establishing the early framework of the CIA. In late October 1944, President Roosevelt asked 
Donovan to submit his views and feedback on the structuring of an intelligence service for the 
post-war period. Donovan issued a November 18 memorandum with his proposal for a central 
intelligence service that would report directly to the President.169 Donovan continued working as 
Director and ensuring operations went smoothly into 1945 as he awaited the President’s decision 
on his proposal for centralizing intelligence. Unfortunately, by April, President Roosevelt had 
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died, leaving Donovan without little hope of establishing a central intelligence agency.170 Soon, 
too, in May 1945, Nazi Germany surrendered, the world’s first atomic bombs fell on Japan, and 
hostilities slowed everywhere. Harry Truman became President at a time when many Americans 
were exhausted by war and were eager to return to the “good old days.” Unfortunately, President 
Roosevelt did not brief Truman about the complexity of the intelligence field at a dawning era in 
American history. Thus, solving the intelligence dilemma was far from the top of Truman’s list 
of priorities.  
At the same time, Truman wanted to start anew. Unlike President Roosevelt, President 
Truman did not like unsolicited reports or visits to the White House. These facts, combined with 
public pressure to cut military expenditure, to disarm, and bring American soldiers home, all but 
ensured that Truman was wary of keeping the OSS in play as a government agency in the 
future.171 During this time, Donovan tried sending reports to the White House, but these efforts 
were futile.  
As the story goes, the Director of the Budget Bureau, Harold Smith, who always disliked 
William Donovan, went to President Truman in the spirit of cleaning up administrative matters 
and urged Truman to dissolve the OSS.172 On August 25, 1945, Donovan informed the Budget 
Bureau that the OSS was working under a liquidation budget and was terminating many of its 
operational activities, including Morale Operations.173 On August 31st, President Truman issued 
Executive Order No. 9608, which established an Interim International Information Service (IIIS) 
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in the Department of State until December 31st and transferred overseas responsibilities from the 
OWI and CIAA. This Executive Order also liquidated the OWI on December 31, 1945.174 
Donovan, now realizing that the end of the psychological warfare agencies was imminent, sent a 
short memorandum to President Truman urging him to keep the OSS together for the sake of 
“national interests.”175 This effort, along with the support from some JCS committees, was not 
enough to deter Truman to take the advice of Harold Smith. Thus, on September 20, 1945, 
President Truman, without consulting Donovan or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued Executive 
Order No. 9620 which terminated the OSS effective on October 1, 1945.176 The Executive Order 
transferred the Foreign Nationalities branch and the Research and Analysis branch to the 
Department of State while transferring the rest of the OSS to the Department of War.177 The 
Research and Analysis branch became the Interim Research and Intelligence Services (IRIS) at 
the Department of State.178  
With the intelligence community in flux, President Truman issued a Presidential 
Directive on January 22, 1946, which established a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) 
consisting of the secretaries of State, War, and Navy, as well as a personal representative of the 
President, in this case, Admiral Leahy.179 The Presidential Directive also established a new 
intelligence unit called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which reported to the NIA. This 
new group replaced IRIS as the primary intelligence agency of the United States. President 
Truman assigned CIG to obtain and synthesize intelligence from the Department of State, 
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Department of War, Department of Navy, and other agencies such as the FBI, and appointed 
Admiral Sidney Souers as its director. Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg from the Air Force 
replaced Admiral Souers and served from June 1946 to May 1947 when he turned the agency 
over to Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter.180 It is easy to see how the various institutional 
problems lead to rapid turnover in these departments during the early post-war period.  
Fortunately, the necessary stability finally arrived. On July 26, 1947, President Truman 
signed the National Security Act of 1947, which renamed and separated the War and Navy 
departments and added the Air Force and Marine Corps to the number of military services. The 
National Security Act also created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency.181 Although President Truman signed the National Security Act into law on 
July 26th, it did not take full effect until September 18th, at which point the Central Intelligence 
Agency was an operational agency.182 The Act also created a Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI) to lead both the CIA and the U.S. Intelligence Community; President Truman selected 
Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who led CIG, as the first DCI. Remarkably, the operative language used to 
setup the CIA in the National Security Act closely resembled ideas that Donovan presented in his 
November 18, 1944 memorandum to President Roosevelt. Indeed, the Central Intelligence 
Agency was based on fundamental OSS principles and Donovan’s recommendations, with one-
third of CIA’s personnel coming from the OSS. For example, the CIA became the central 
authority of total U.S. intelligence and was put under the direction of the National Security 
Council, not military control.183 The establishment of the CIA is a true testament to the legacy of 
 
180 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA, 377. 
181 Lawrence C. Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda, 220. 
182 Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS, 316. 
183 Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA, 93. 
63 
 
the OSS and William Donovan, who finally got to see his proposal realized, even if he would not 



















 This study examined the nature of psychological warfare by the United States in World 
War II. While there are countless books and articles about the numerous recorded uses of 
propaganda and psychological warfare by the United States during the War, there is no possible 
way to encapsulate all the lessons, themes, and ideas into any single written work. Nevertheless, 
there is one theme that stands out: the psychological warfare methods, procedures, and tactics 
that the OSS established during Operation Torch in North Africa were instrumental in laying the 
foundation for U.S. intelligence operations in the post-World War II period. Operation Torch 
was the first major operation of the OSS, and in effect, the first significant psychological warfare 
operation by the United States in World War II. 
 While most scholars agree that Operation Torch was a success, it did not go entirely to 
plan. What is more important, however, is that OSS leaders drew lessons from Operation Torch’s 
success and failures and applied them to its later operations by reviewing its actions and the 
results. It learned from its mistakes and it became better in the process. In North Africa in 1942, 
the OSS learned to draw on resistance groups for support, to utilize radio propaganda to destroy 
morale, to spread rumors to discredit the enemy, to produce leaflets and pamphlets that 
influenced populations, and much more. Although some of these first instances of psychological 
warfare were not always successful, these lessons and processes set the stage for the OSS Morale 
Operations Branch to reach its true potential in 1944. From Operations Torch, Husky, Overlord, 
and others beyond, the OSS went from producing material that populations could not understand 
to producing material that even deceived its own soldiers into believing it was enemy 
propaganda. It also developed a sense of realpolitik, as evinced by its willingness to collaborate 
even with groups – like the Partisans in Hungary – who otherwise seemed to have other 
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allegiances. While Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East were vastly different areas in World 
War II, each with its own situation, Morale Operations applied what it had learned in North 
Africa in a way that accomplished its objectives. In Europe, it sent out pamphlets explaining 
good treatment for enemy POWs, causing them to surrender. In the Middle East, Morale 
Operations sent poison-pen letters and forged copies of Life magazine, causing enemy soldiers to 
distrust each other. In the Far East, a relative lack of “black” propaganda targets led Morale 
Operations to turn to “white” propaganda, even recruiting a famous Chinese cartoon artist who 
produced his art from afar, from Calcutta in India.  
 At the same time that the OSS was conducting these operations, the United States 
underwent significant changes in its intelligence gathering agencies and military departments. 
Tensions over jurisdiction of “white” and “black” propaganda and restrictions on the OSS forced 
the OSS to adapt and execute its mission while coordinating with other agencies and military 
divisions. Ultimately, despite the significant success of the OSS, the coming of the end of World 
War II brought pressure from the public to disarm. Eventually, President Truman abolished the 
OSS and instituted a number of transitional intelligence agencies until a permanent Central 
Intelligence Agency could be formed, based on William Donovan’s proposals. There is no doubt 
that the Central Intelligence Agency inherited many of the foundational principles of the OSS, 
and by default, many of the psychological warfare practices and procedures that the OSS learned 
in North Africa. Thus, while American psychological warfare has evolved over the years, it 
seems that its origins lie in Operation Torch and present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. 
This is significant because if American military and propaganda scholars are to better understand 
psychological warfare, they must understand its modern origins, its original context, and the at 
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